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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
BRAD LYNN MONTGOMERY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050945-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for distributing a controlled substance, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West 2004), and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the prosecutor's misstatement of the evidence in his opening require a 
mistrial where the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the statement and the 
evidence of defendant's guilt was compelling? 
Standard of Review. Motions for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct 
are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68,f18,8 P.3d 1025. 
2. Did the trial court properly reject defendant's jury instruction where the 
instruction was included in substance in the jury instructions given? 
Standard of Review. "'The standard of review for jury instructions to which 
counsel has objected is correctness/" State v. Pearson, 985 P.2d 919,921 (Utah App 
1999) (citation omitted). This Court reviews jury instructions "in their entirety and 
will affirm when the jury instructions ta ken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the 
law applicable to the case." State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201,205 (Utah 1992). 
3. Did the trial court properly overrule defendant's objection to a police 
witness reading a portion of his police report on redirect, where defendant had used 
the report to attack the officer's credibility on cross-examination? 
Standard of Review. "The appropriate standard of review for questions of 
admissibility of evidence is the abuse of discretion standard." Salt Lake City v. 
Garcia, 912 P.2d 997,999 (Utah App 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Issue three of this appeal concerns rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by 
a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of 
any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought 
in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with distributing a controlled substance, a first 
degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. (R. 43-
2 
42). A jury convicted defendant on both counts. (R. 363,361). The court sentenced 
defendant to concurrent terms of one to five years for the distribution charge and six 
months on the paraphernalia charge (R. 410-08). Defendant timely appealed (R. 
412). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court (R. 421). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS* 
On March 18,2004, defendant sold a methamphetamine-filled balloon to Mike 
Collier. (R. 435:185-86; 291-92; 436:13,22). Unbeknownst to defendant, Mike was a 
police informant and the drug transaction was being monitored by the Uintah Basin 
Narcotics Strike Force (R. 435:176, 184-86). Members of the strike force had 
searched Collier and his truck before the transaction, concealed a wire on him, and 
given him $350 to purchase the drugs (R. 435:180-81; 436:12-13). 
Following the sale, defendant drove past the strike force (R. 435:189). He 
immediately called Collier on his cell phone and told him to watch out for "bears," 
in the area, and told him not to "be crazy." (R. 435:191, 207, 287; 436:20-21, 114; 
State's Ex. 5). Collier understood the reference to "bears" to mean police (R. 436:20). 
Immediately after the transaction, police met with Collier and recovered the 
drugs he had purchased from the defendant and the wire he was wearing (R. 
1
 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, <H 2,12 P.3d 92. 
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435:199). They searched Collier and his vehicle again and found nothing out of the 
ordinary (R. 435:199). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT II. A prosecutor's reference to inadmissible evidence only requires a 
mistrial if there is reasonably likelihood that the reference influenced the jury's 
verdict. Here, the prosecutor's reference to inadmissible evidence was harmless 
because the trial court issued a curative instruction, and the evidence was never 
again mentioned. Moreover, the evidence of defendant's guilt was compelling. 
POINT III. A party is not entitled to a jury instruction that is already 
included in substance in other instructions. Here, defendant's jury instruction 
regarding the weight a jury may gi^e to a witness's prior felony conviction was 
included, in substance, in jury instruction number seven. Thus, the court did not err 
in refusing defendant's instruction. 
POINT IV. Under rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence, once a party introduces a 
portion of a writing, the opposing party may introduce other portions of the writing 
that ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with the first portion. 
Here, after defendant tried to impeach the officer with one portion of the report, the 
trial court properly allowed the officer to read that portion of his report and a 
related portion. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROSECUTOR'S MISSTATEMENT WAS HARMLESS 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to 
order a mistrial after the prosecutor referred in his opening to evidence he had 
agreed not to introduce. 
A. Proceedings Below. 
During opening statements, the prosecutor told the jury that when police 
arrested defendant they "found paraphernalia on the defendant's person consistent 
with methamphetamine use." (R. 435:131). After opening statements and outside 
the presence of the jury, the defendant moved for a mistrial (R. 435:144). He claimed 
that the prosecutor had agreed in a pre-trial discovery letter not to introduce any 
evidence seized during defendant's arrest (R. 435:139-40). After refreshing his 
memory with the letter, the prosecutor agreed that he had told defendant he would 
not rely on any evidence seized at the arrest (R. 435:142^13). 
The court decided the misstatement was curable and asked defendant to 
propose a cure (R. 435:143). Defendant argued that a curative instruction would do 
more harm than good, and moved for a mistrial (R. 435:143-44). The court 
disagreed and asked defendant to propose an instruction (R. 435:144). After some 
discussion, the parties and the court agreed to tell the jury that the prosecutor made 
an error in his opening and that State bases the paraphernalia charge on the 
5 
packaging used in the drug transfer (R. 435:145-46). When the court reconvened, it 
explained the prosecutor's error and told the jury that the paraphernalia charge was 
based on the packaging of the drugs during the transfer (R. 435:162). Defendant 
agreed that court's explanation was sufficient: 
The Court: 
Mr. Thomas: 
The Court: 
Mr. Breeze: 
Mr. Thomas has informed me that in his opening 
statement, he made an error. The second charge in the 
information of the charge of paraphernalia, the State 
relies upon to prove that charge the packaging that 
was located at the time of the transfer. As I 
understand it, Mr. Thomas, is that your theory in this 
case is, is that drugs were transferred and they were 
packaged in some item, and it's your theory in this 
case that the paraphernalia was the packaging item 
with the drugs that were transferred—the alleged 
drugs that were transferred; is that correct? 
That is correct Your Honor. 
Does that satisfy you, counsel— 
Yes, Your Honor. 
(R. 435:162). 
B. In light of the court's curative instruction and the compelling 
evidence of defendant's guilt, the prosecutor's misstatement 
was harmless. 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting a 
mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. Aplt. Br. at 4,14-15. This Court should 
reject this claim because defendant has not shown prejudice. 
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To obtain a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must show 
that (1) the prosecutor made comments that "call the jurors' attention to matters not 
proper for their consideration" and that (2) those comments "have a reasonable 
likelihood of prejudicing the jury by significantly influencing its verdict." State v. 
Reed, 2000 UT 68,118,8 P.3d 1025. The second part of the test regarding prejudice 
requires the defendant to show that "there is a reasonable likelihood the jury would 
have reached a more favorable result absent the comments." Id. See also Stevenson, 
884 P.2d at 1290. 
This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a mistrial motion for abuse of 
discretion. See State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,1230 (Utah 1997), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, % 25 n . l l , 61 P.3d 1000; State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 
33, 1 1, 116 P.3d 305. Once the trial court determines that an incident did not 
prejudice the jury, this Court's review of the incident is more limited. Id. at 1231. 
"Unless a review of the record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong in 
that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to 
have had a fair trial, [this Court] will not find that the court's decision was an abuse 
of discretion." Id. 
In assessing prejudice, this Court must also consider the effect of any curative 
instructions. Courts "generally presume that a jury will follow the instructions 
given it." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994). Where a court cures a 
7 
prosecutor's misstatement by instruction rather than a mistrial, the instruction is 
"presumed on appeal to be effective." State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah 
1997); see also Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756,766 n.8 (1987) ("We normally presume that 
a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently 
presented to it...."); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200,206 (1987) (noting the "almost 
invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions"). A curative 
instruction is insufficient only when there is an "overwhelming probability that the 
jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions . . . and strong likelihood that 
the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant." Greer, 483 U.S. at 
766 n.8 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Here, the trial court determined that the misstatement did not require a 
mistrial (R. 435:144). Thus, this Court's review is limited to determining whether 
"the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have 
had a fair trial." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1231. 
The misstatement in this case did not render defendant's trial unfair. It 
occurred early on, was immediately corrected, and was never referred to again. 
Moreover, the court's instructions to the jury directed the jury not to consider the 
prosecutor's misstatement. Before the introduction of any evidence, the court told 
the jury about the prosecutor's error and then instructed them correctly as to the 
State's theory of the case (R. 435:162),, Later, at the close of evidence, the court gave 
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two instructions that directed the jury not to consider the misstatement. Jury 
instruction number five told the jury to decide questions of fact "solely by the 
evidence introduced before you" (R. 386). Jury instruction number twenty-one 
stated that "[a]ny statement of counsel made during the course of the trial or during 
argument which is not supported by the evidence is to be wholly disregarded" (R. 
370). Because no evidence of the paraphernalia seized at defendant's arrest was 
introduced at trial, the jury was bound by these instructions to disregard the 
prosecutor's statement. 
Any impropriety here falls well below others found harmless by the Utah 
Supreme Court, and does not carry an "overwhelming probability" that the jury 
ignored the curative instruction. In State v. Harmon, for example, there were several 
instances of "over-zealous advocacy as well as bad judgment on the part of the 
prosecutor." State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 1998). The prosecutor had, 
among other things, repeatedly accused defense counsel of misrepresenting the 
evidence when, in fact, defense was correct and the prosecutor was the one 
misrepresenting the evidence. Id. at 277. The trial court gave curative instructions 
to the jury and even warned the prosecutor of a possible mistrial should the conduct 
continue. Id. The Utah Supreme Court determined that the trial court's curative 
instructions provided "'ample clarification'" of the prosecutor's remarks and 
behavior, and affirmed Harmon's convictions. Id. 
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The misstatement in the instant case is much less egregious than in Harmon. 
The prosecutor made one misrepresentation in his opening, not several 
misrepresentations during the presentation of evidence. The trial court then gave a 
curative instruction that corrected the prosecutor's error. If a curative instruction 
was sufficient to remedy the repeated misstatements in Harmon, it is certainly 
sufficient to remedy the lone misstatement in the instant case. 
Moreover, the effect of the improperly referenced evidence was not 
"devastating" to defendant because the State presented compelling evidence of 
defendant's guilt. "If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged.. . remark 
will not be presumed prejudicial" State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) 
(additional quotation and citation omitted). The State adduced the following 
evidence in support of defendant's guilt of possession of a controlled substance and 
possession of drug paraphernalia: 
1. The informant, Mike Collier, testified that he purchased a balloon filled 
with methamphetamine from defendant (R. 436:17-26). 
2. Detectives Keith Campbell and Bob Taylor and Lieutenant Dylan Rooks, 
testified that they searched Collier before and after he purchased the 
drugs and that they monitored the drug transaction via Collier's wire and 
recognized defendant's voice (R. 435:180-81,184-85; 436:88,92-93,109). 
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3. Lieutenant Dylan Rooks testified to seeing defendant drive past the 
officers after the buy. (R. 435:110). 
4. Immediately after the buy, the officers recovered the drugs Collier 
purchased from defendant and searched his person and vehicle again (R. 
435:199). 
5. The State played the tape recording of defendant's telephone call to Collier 
after the buy and the Collier's debriefing by Detective Campbell. (R. 
436:208-11,319; State's Ex. 5). 
6. David Murdock, the State criminologist, testified that the substance inside 
the packaging from the buy was methamphetamine. (R. 436:84). 
This evidence unequivocally established that defendant knowingly 
distributed a controlled substance and used paraphernalia designed to "pack, 
repack, store, contain, [and] conceal" that substance. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8 
& 58-37a-5. Because the court issued a presumptively effective curative instruction 
and the remaining evidence of defendant's guilt was compelling, defendant's claim 
fails. 
Defendant nevertheless claims that the curative instruction "ma[d]e the 
matter worse" because the prosecutor "gained, first, by making a remark to the jury 
that they should never have heard, and second he gained by having the judge 
explain his theory of the case to the jury." Aplt. Br. at 14. 
11 
Defendant's claim constitutes invited error. "Affirmative representations that 
a party has no objection to the proceedings fall within the scope of the invited error 
doctrine because such representations reassure the trial court and encourage it to 
proceed without further consideration of the issues." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, % 
16, 128 P.3d 1171. While defendant initially moved for a mistrial, he ultimately 
helped craft and approved the trial court's curative instruction (R. 435:144-46,162). 
He cannot now complain that the instruction aggravated the situation. Accordingly, 
this court should disregard his claim that the instruction compounded the error and 
affirm the trial court's denial of his motion for a mistrial. 
II. DEFENDANT'S JURY INSTRUCTION WAS INCLUDED IN 
SUBSTANCE IN THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that 
it could consider a witness's prior felony convictions when it assessed his 
credibility. Aplt. Br. at 16. Defendant's claim is meritless because his requested 
instruction was included in substance in instruction number seven. 
A, Proceedings Below 
At the end of the first day of trial, the parties and the court discussed the jury 
instructions. Defendant submitted fifteen jury instructions, ten of which concerned 
witness credibility (R. 252-235). Defendant's instruction number two told the jury 
that it could consider prior felony convictions in evaluating witness credibility: 
12 
The testimony of a witness may be discredited or impeached by 
showing that the witness has been convicted of a felony, that is, of a 
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of years. A prior 
conviction does not mean that a witness is incompetent to testify, but is 
merely one circumstance that you may consider in determining the 
credibility of the witness. You may decide how much weight to give 
any prior conviction that was used to impeach a witness. 
(R. 249; 435:329-35). 
The trial court rejected defendant's jury instruction (R. 435:335). It opted 
instead to instruct the jury that it could evaluate witness credibility using a variety 
of factors, including the witness's prior felony convictions (R. 384; 435:334-35): 
You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of the 
weight to be given to the testimony of the different witnesses who have 
testified in this case, you may take into consideration bias, if any has 
been show; their demeanor while testifying; how the information or 
knowledge was obtained; the apparent fairness or want of fairness; the 
interest the witness may have in the result of the trial; the 
reasonableness of the testimony; prior felony convictions; and any 
other factor which you believe is relevant to the witnesses credibility. 
(R. 384). While defendant initially told the court that he was "not adamant" about 
any of his instructions (R. 435:328), he ultimately objected to the court's refusal to 
give his instruction (R. 435:335). 
B. Defendant's jury instruction was included in substance in the 
instructions as given. 
This Court reviews the trial court's jury instructions for correctness. See State 
v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, \ 19,4 P.3d 778. The refusal of jury instruction is not reviewed 
in isolation, however. See State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201,205 (Utah 1992). Rather, 
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the instructions are reviewed as a whole, and this Court must affirm the trial court 
when "the jury instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the case." Id. In other words, a defendant has no right to a particular 
instruction, so long as the instructions as a whole correctly instruct the jury on the 
law and allow the defendant to present his theory of the case. Id. at 205-06 (noting 
that it is not error to refuse a proposed instruction when the point is adequately 
covered in other instructions). 
In the instant case, the jury was correctly instructed that it could consider a 
witness's prior felonies in evaluating his credibility. Instruction number seven told 
jurors that they were the "sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of the 
weight to be given to the testimony of the different witnesses" and that they could 
consider a witness's "prior felony convictions" (R. 384). In fact, instruction number 
seven conveyed essentially the same information as defendant's instruction number 
two. Both stated that a prior felony conviction is one circumstance that the jury 
could consider in evaluating a witness's credibility (Compare R. 249 with R. 384). 
Defendant nevertheless claims that he was "seriously prejudiced" by the trial 
court's denial of his requested instruction number two because it "was consistent 
with the Utah Rules of Evidence" and "properly represented the law." Aplt. Br. at 
15-17. Defendant's claim fails to properly state the law. As already explained, a 
defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction merely because it correctly states the 
14 
law. '"[A] defendant is not entitled to an instruction which is redundant or 
repetitive of principles enunciated in other instructions given to the jury/" Parker, 
2000 UT 51, \ 19 (citation omitted). Because defendant's requested jury instruction 
was "redundant . . . of principles enunciated in other instructions given to the jury/" 
Parker, 2000 UT 51,119, the trial court did not err in refusing the instruction. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE POLICE 
REPORT TO BE READ INTO EVIDENCE 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in allowing Detective Keith 
Campbell to read a portion of a report he prepared in answer defendant's pre-trial 
discovery requests. Aplt. Br. at 17-18. He asserts the report was hearsay and 
should have been excluded. Alt. Br. at 18. Defendant's claim is meritless because he 
used the report in his cross-examination of Detective Campbell, and the report was 
properly admitted under the rule of completeness. 
A. Proceedings Below 
In response to defendant's discovery requests, Detective Campbell prepared a 
report detailing his contact with the confidential informant, Mike Collier (R. 87-86, 
276, 272; 435:267). During cross examination, defendant questioned Detective 
Campbell about the second paragraph of the report (R. 435:267-69). He noted that 
the second paragraph stated that Collier did not contact anyone on the Uintah Basin 
Narcotics Strike Force, except to express his desire to work as an informant, until the 
15 
day of the controlled buy between defendant and Collier (R. 435:267). Defendant 
then pointed out that Detective Campbell had previously testified that he spoke 
with Collier numerous times before the day of the controlled buy (R. 435:267-69). 
On redirect examination, the prosecutor referred the detective to the report 
and asked him to read the first and second paragraph (R. 435:275). Defendant 
objected and said, 'The only thing I brought up was the second paragraph. We're 
gonna have to do some serious redacting" (R. 435:275). The trial court overruled his 
objection and allowed the detective to read the first and second paragraphs (R. 
435:275-76). Those paragraphs stated the following: 
C.I. #04-303 began his/her work with the Uintah Basin Narcotics Strike 
Force as a result of his/her conviction. CI . #04-303 informed Detective 
Sergeant Keith Campbell that he/she wanted to work for the "Strike 
Force" in order to mitigate his /her sentence. 
C.I. #04-303 did not contact anyone with the Uintah Basin Narcotics 
Strike Force other than to mention his/her desire to work as an 
informant until the actual day- he /she contacted Detective Sergeant 
Campbell and stated that he /she had arranged to purchase 
methamphetamine from Brad Montgomery. 
(R. 272; 435:276). 
After reading the paragraphs, Detective Campbell explained that his reference 
to contact with Colliers in the report referred only to contacts related to the Uintah 
Basin Narcotics Strike Force (R. 435:276). He further explained that his contacts with 
16 
Collier before the controlled buy with defendant related to non-Strike Force 
business such as personal matters or other criminal cases (R. 435:276-77). 
B. Defendant's hearsay claim is unpreserved; moreover, the 
report was admissible under the completeness rule. 
As a threshold matter, this Court should refuse to reach defendant's hearsay 
claim because the claims is unpreserved. Generally, "a contemporaneous objection 
or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the 
trial court record before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal." State 
v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)). The objection below must "be specific 
enough to give the trial court notice of the very e r ror . . . complained of." Tolman v. 
Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah App. 1996) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859,860 (Utah 
1983)). Specificity is necessary for the trial court "to assess allegations by isolating 
relevant facts and considering them in the context of the specific legal doctrine 
placed at issue." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,361 (Utah App. 1993). For that reason, 
"a general objection may be insufficient to preserve a specific substantive issue for 
appeal." Id. 
In the instant case, defendant never objected to the police report on hearsay 
grounds. He merely made an unspecified objection without any argument or 
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authority (R. 435:275). He then sat silent as the trial court overruled his objection 
without explanation and allowed the detective to read the report (R. 435:275-76). 
Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court understood defendant to be 
objecting on hearsay grounds or that its ruling resolved a hearsay issue. Thus, 
defendant's unspecified objection did not preserve a hearsay claim for appeal, and 
this Court should disregard the claini. See Brown, 856 P.2d at 361. 
Even had defendant made a specific objection on hearsay grounds, his claim 
would fail on its merits. The grounds on which the trial court admitted the first and 
second paragraph of the report are not clear, but the court's decision is consistent 
with the rule of completeness in rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence. Under that rule, 
"[w]hen a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an 
adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any 
other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered 
contemporaneously with it." Utah R. Evid. 106. Trial courts have "considerable 
discretion in determining issues of fairness." State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, \ 45, 
993 P.2d 232.2 
2
 The trial court's failure to explain the grounds for overruling defendant's 
objection is not a bar to this Court deciding the issue under rule 106. This Court 
may affirm the trial court on any ground apparent in the record. See State v. Allred, 
2002 UT App 291, \ 8,55 P.3d 1158. 
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In the instant case, defendant used the report in question to attack Detective 
Campbell's credibility (R. 435:267-69). He specifically referred to those parts of the 
report that discussed the detective's contact with Colliers before the controlled buy 
(R. 435:267-69). On redirect, the trial court properly permitted the State to introduce 
all of those parts of the report that referred to the Detective's contact with Collier 
before the controlled buy, namely paragraphs one and two. Those paragraphs were 
necessary for Detective Campbell to explain the apparent inconsistency between his 
trial testimony and the report. The court's ruling thus fits squarely within the 
provisions of rule 106 that permit the court to admit parts of a document that "ought 
in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it." Utah R. Evid. 106. 
In any event, any error in admitting the first and second paragraphs of the 
report was harmless at worst because the paragraphs only revealed information that 
was already before the jury. "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does 
not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." Utah R. Crim. P. 
30(a). Evidence that is improperly admitted is harmless if the substance of the 
evidence is already properly admitted. See State v. Ott, 763 P.2d 810,812-13 (Utah 
App. 1988) (holding that improperly admitted receipt was harmless because value 
of stolen goods was established independent of receipt). 
In the instant case, the information in paragraphs one and two of Detective 
Campbell's report had already come in without objection through his testimony. (R. 
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435:167-68, 267). Detective Campbell testified on direct examination that Collier 
wanted to try to reduce his sentence by working with the strike force (R. 435:167). 
Later, on cross examination, defendant elicited testimony that Collier had no contact 
with the strike force, other than to express his interest in working as an informant, 
until the day of the controlled buy with defendant (R. 435:267). Thus, any error was 
harmless, and this Court should affirm defendant's convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted September 20,2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEXGENERAL 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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THE COURT: THE COLLIER FAMILY? 
JUROR: THE COLLIER FAMILY, WILL THAT HAVE ANYTHING TO 
DO WITH MY TESTIMONY? BECAUSE MY SON IS MARRIED TO MIKE'S 
EX-WIFE. MY SON IS MARRIED TO — 
THE COURT: WELL, I DON'T ~ 
JUROR: — WAS — 
THE COURT: — TRULY UNDERSTAND THE RELATIONSHIP, BUT 
WHY DON'T WE TALK TO YOU IN CHAMBERS FOR A MINUTE. 
JUROR: I'M SORRY. 
THE COURT: WE'LL EXCUSE JURY, ALL OF YOU. AND THEN 
YOUR NAME AGAIN IS? 
JUROR: CONNIE BOREN. 
THE COURT: MS. BOREN, DON'T TALK ABOUT THESE THINGS IN 
THE JURY ROOM, AND THEN WE'LL SEE IF YOU HAVE A CONFLICT 
HERE. 
JUROR: OKAY. 
THE COURT: WE'LL BE GLAD TO TALK TO YOU. MR. BREEZE 
ASKED TO BE ABLE TO TALK TO ME ABOUT OTHER ISSUES OUTSIDE THE 
PRESENCE OF THE JURY. WE'LL EXCUSE THE JURY AT THIS TIME. 
(THE JURY LEAVES THE COURTROOM.) 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE RECORD WILL INDICATE THE 
JURY HAS BEEN TAKEN INTO THE JURY ROOM. YOU HAD AN ISSUE YOU 
WANTED TO TALK ABOUT, MR. BREEZE? 
MR. BREEZE: I DID, YOUR HONOR. THERE'S — AND JUST TO 
GIVE YOU A BRIEF FACTUAL BACKGROUND, AFTER THIS TRANSACTION, 
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THEY WENT — OR THE ALLEGED TRANSACTION, THEY WENT AND 
ARRESTED MR. MONTGOMERY ROUGHLY HALF AN HOUR LATER. AT THAT 
TIME, THEY CUFFED HIM, TOOK HIS WALLET. INSIDE HIS WALLET 
THEY FOUND TWO SMALL PLASTIC BAGGIES, ZIPLOC STYLE THAT I'M 
SURE YOU'VE SEEN MANY TIMES, ABOUT ONE INCH BY ONE INCH 
ROUGHLY. AND ORIGINALLY THEY CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS SOME 
METHAMPHETAMINE RESIDUE IN ONE OF THEM. WE DEMANDED A LAB 
TEST. AT THAT POINT, THE PROSECUTOR SENT ME A LETTER — AND 
I'VE GOT IT HERE ~ SAYING, WE'RE NOT GOING TO BRING UP THE 
THINGS THAT WERE SEIZED FROM MR. MONTGOMERY AT THE TIME OF 
HIS ARREST FOR ANY PURPOSE. AND NOW WE'VE GOT THEM IN THEIR 
OPENING STATEMENT COMING UP SAYING, HE'S GOT BAGGIES, HE HAD 
PARAPHERNALIA WHEN THEY ARRESTED HIM EVEN THOUGH — AND 
WE'VE — WE WERE — YOU KNOW, WE BROUGHT THIS TO THEIR 
ATTENTION, AND THEY SENT US A LETTER SAYING, FINE, WE'RE NOT 
i 
GOING TO USE THAT. NOW THEY USED IT. AND THAT'S MY 
ARGUMENT. 
MR. THOMAS: I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE REFERENCE TO THAT 
LETTER. IF I DID MAKE THAT AGREEMENT, THEN I WOULD STRICTLY 
COMPLY WITH THAT. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT WAS MY INTENT ON THE 
AGREEMENT. I BELIEVE THE INTENT WAS ~ AND THIS WAS ACTUALLY 
MADE WITH MR. MAURO BEFORE MR. BREEZE CAME ON, AND I BELIEVE 
EVEN BEFORE THE PRELIMINARY HEARING. AND THAT WAS AT THE 
TIME THE OFFICERS MADE THE ARREST, THEY DID BELIEVE THERE WAS 
METHAMPHETAMINE RESIDUE. THE INITIAL ANTICIPATION WOULD BE 
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THAT THEY WOULD CHARGE A SEPARATE POSSESSION OF 
METHAMPHETAMINE CASE. AND IN FACT, IT CAME TO MY OFFICE, WAS 
SCREENED, AND I DID FILE THAT CHARGE BASED ON THE RESIDUE IN 
THE BAGGIE. IT WAS LATER DETERMINED THAT WE WOULD NOT PURSUE 
THE POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE BASED ON THE RESIDUE IN 
THAT BAGGIE AND WE WOULD FOCUS JUST ON THE DISTRIBUTION 
CHARGE. IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING BOTH WITH MR. MAURO AND WITH 
MR. BREEZE THAT WE WOULD RELY ON THAT PARAPHERNALIA. BUT IF 
I DID PROVIDE CORRESPONDENCE — WHICH I DON'T HAVE ALL MY 
CORRESPONDENCE WITH ME — THAT INDICATES THAT I WOULD NOT 
BRING IT UP FOR ANY PURPOSE, I'M HAPPY TO COMPLY WITH THAT. 
IF IT WAS JUST FOR THE PURPOSES OF NOT CHARGING THE 
POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE, THEN I BELIEVE I'M ENTITLED TO 
USE IT FOR THE PARAPHERNALIA. 
MR. BREEZE: AND I'VE GOT THE LETTER HERE IF YOU'D LIKE 
TO — IT'S ACTUALLY YOUR LETTER TO ME — 
MR. THOMAS: YEAH, AND THAT'S WHY I ~ 
MR. BREEZE: — MARCH 3RD — OR MARCH 5TH OF THIS YEAR. 
MR. THOMAS: CAN I GET THE SPECIFIC QUESTION THAT THIS 
WAS A RESPONSE TO? DO YOU HAVE THAT? 
MR. BREEZE: YOU KNOW, I DON'T HAVE ALL OF MY 
CORRESPONDENCE IN SERIATIM HERE, BUT — 
MR. THOMAS: FOR THE RECORD, IF I CAN JUST INDICATE, IT 
SAYS — AND IT SAYS, IN RESPONSE TO THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS 
YOU INCLUDED IN YOUR CORRESPONDENCE WITH MY REQUEST FOR 
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DISCOVERY, I AM PROVIDING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION. ONE, 
THE STATE WILL RELY ON THE OFF-WHITE RUBBER SLEEVE AND ZIPLOC 
BAGGIE THAT CONTAIN METHAMPHETAMINE WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF 
THE CONTROLLED BUY. 
OKAY. THAT DESCRIBES ITEM ONE DASH 160 — OKAY. THAT'S 
IT. THE STATE DOES NOT INTEND TO USE ANY PHYSICAL 
EVIDENCE — NO, IT APPEARS THAT I HAVE — THE STATE DOES NOT 
INTEND TO USE ANY PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OBTAINED AT THE TIME OF 
HIS ARREST ON MARCH 18TH. 
MR. BREEZE: IN THE VICINITY OF AN ADDRESS, AND THAT'S 
WHERE — 
MR. THOMAS: IN THE VICINITY OF 1500 SOUTH 1500 EAST. 
SO IT DOES APPEAR THAT I MADE THAT AGREEMENT, EVEN THOUGH — 
THE COURT: WHY DIDN'T YOU BRING THAT — 
MR. THOMAS: — I DON'T RECALL THAT. 
THE COURT: — UP WHEN I TALKED ABOUT THE CHARGES? 
MR. BREEZE: WELL, THE — THAT'S WHAT THIS SAYS, THAT 
THE PARAPHERNALIA — 
THE COURT: YOU'RE NOT RESPONDING TO MY QUESTION. I 
WANT YOU TO LISTEN TO MY QUESTION. THIS MORNING WHEN I WAS 
TALKING TO THE JURY, I SPECIFICALLY 
BASED UPON WHAT YOU'VE JUST TOLD ME, 
CHARGE WOULDN' T BE PROSECUTED — 
MR. BREEZE: IF YOU PLEASE 
SHORT-CIRCUIT THIS IN A HURRY. 
LET 
TOLD 
THAT 
THEM 
THE 
TWO CHARGES. 
PARAPHERNALIA 
ME EXPLAIN, I 
THERE'S -
CAN 
- THEY'RE CLAIMING, 
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AT LEAST ACCORDING TO THIS LETTER, THEY'RE CLAIMING THAT THE 
PARAPHERNALIA WAS THE PACKAGING MATERIAL ON THE BUY UP NEAR 
THE ROD AND GUN CLUB THAT ~ THE CASE THAT WE'RE TALKING 
ABOUT, AND NOT THE — NOT THOSE BAGGIES THAT THEY FOUND IN 
HIS — IN HIS WALLET — 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. BREEZE: — THE PARAPHERNALIA IS THE PACKAGING 
MATERIAL. 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND. IS THAT THE BASIS FOR YOUR 
PARAPHERNALIA CHARGE? 
MR. THOMAS: WELL, IN MY MIND, I HAD IT THE OTHER. BUT 
I HAVE MADE THE AGREEMENT THAT I WOULD NOT BRING UP THAT 
OTHER EVIDENCE. 
THE COURT: SO WHAT DO YOU INTEND TO DO WITH COUNT 2? 
DO YOU STILL WANT TO — 
MR. THOMAS: COUNT 2, I'LL JUST HAVE TO RELY ON THE 
PACKAGING MATERIAL. 
THE COURT: PACKAGING MATERIAL? 
MR. THOMAS: UH-HUH. 
THE COURT: AND HOW WOULD YOU SUGGEST — I'LL GIVE YOU 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A SUGGESTION, MR. BREEZE — THAT WE 
DEAL WITH THE OPENING STATEMENTS WHERE HE TALKED ABOUT — 
MR. BREEZE: WELL, YOU COULD ALWAYS INSTRUCT THE JURY 
AND SAY THERE WAS A COMMENT MADE. DISREGARD IT. WE RUN THE 
RISK THAT IT'LL MAKE IT EVEN WORSE BY BRINGING ATTENTION TO 
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IT. AND I CAN'T RECALL, MAYBE THE COURT REPORTER CAN READ 
BACK THE EXACT STATEMENT TO US, BUT IT SEEMS — MY 
RECOLLECTION IS THAT THE PROSECUTOR SAID, AND THEN WHEN THEY 
ARRESTED HIM, HE HAD DRUG BAGGIES CONSISTENT WITH DRUG 
SELLING ACTIVITIES, OR SOMETHING OF THAT GENERAL NATURE. 
MR. THOMAS: I BELIEVE IT WAS DRUG USE, AND I DID MAKE 
THAT COMMENT IN MY OPENING STATEMENT. 
MR. BREEZE: AND I'M — AND SO I'M — YOUR HONOR, I'M 
MOVING FOR A MISTRIAL AT THIS TIME BASED UPON THAT. I DON'T 
THINK IT'S CURABLE BY AN INSTRUCTION. 
THE COURT: WELL, I THINK IT IS CURABLE. I'M ASKING YOU 
TO SUGGEST A CURE, THOUGH. 
MR. BREEZE: WELL, OUR CURE WOULD BE THAT YOU TELL THE 
JURY MR. THOMAS HAS ADVESED ME THAT THERE'S BEEN A PROBLEM, 
THAT HE MISTAKENLY SAID IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT THAT THERE 
WAS DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ON MR. MONTGOMERY, AND THAT HE'S NOW 
ADVISED THE COURT THAT THAT IS NOT IN FACT THE CASE, AND THAT 
HE APOLOGIZES AND WE ALL APOLOGIZE. 
THE COURT: WELL, E'VE SEEN THESE CASES TURN, AND IT MAY 
BECOME RELEVANT LATER ON BASED UPON TESTIMONY AND ESPECIALLY 
IF YOU CLIENT DECIDES TO TESTIFY, 
CLIENT TESTIFIES 
FACTS DON'T EXIST 
TESTIFYING AND — 
1 MR. BREEZE: 
IN CERTAIN WAYS. 
IF THERE'S 
I THINK IT 
ANY 
AND 
SO 
ESPECIALLY IF 
I HATE 
POSSIBILITY 
TO 
OF 
SAY 
YOUR 
'S SAFE TO SAY MY CLIENT 
YOUR 
THOSE 
CLIENT 
WILL NOT 
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BE TESTIFYING. 
THE COURT: WOULD IT BE SUFFICIENT THEN TO SAY THAT 
MR. THOMAS HAS ADVISED ME THAT HE WAS IN ERROR IN ONE 
RESPECT. THE STATE DOES NOT MAINTAIN THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD 
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ON HIS POSSESSION AT THE TIME OF THE — 
HIS ARREST — OR THE TIME OF HIS ARREST. TO SUPPORT COUNT 2, 
STATE WILL RELY UPON PACKAGING MATERIAL THAT THE ALLEGED 
DRUGS WERE PACKAGED IN — 
MR. BREEZE: WHICH CONTAINED THE ALLEGED DRUGS. AND 
COULD YOU SAY, INSTEAD OF — HOW DID YOU SAY IT? THE STATE 
IS RELYING ON? IS THAT A GOOD — 
THE COURT: WELL, I ~ YOU KNOW, I'VE KIND OF TAKEN 
SHORTHAND OF THIS. I'LL INFORM THEM THAT COUNT 2 IS 
POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA, AND MR. THOMAS HAS INFORMED ME 
THAT HE WAS IN ERROR IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT CONCERNING THE 
EVIDENCE THE STATE WILL INTRODUCE TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR 
COUNT 2. THAT THE STATE WILL RELY UPON — THE STATE DOES NOT 
RELY UPON TO SUPPORT COUNT NUMBER 2 ANYTHING THAT WAS FOUND 
AT THE TIME OF ARREST — 
MR. BREEZE: WELL, SHOULDN'T WE LEAVE THAT OUT? THAT 
IMPLIES SOMETHING WAS FOUND, BUT WE'RE KEEPING IT SECRET FROM 
THEM. 
THE COURT: OKAY. I GUESS I CAN SAY THE STATE WILL RELY 
UPON THE PACKAGING MATERIAL OF THE ALLEGED DRUGS WHICH WERE 
ALLEGEDLY TRANSFERRED. 
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MR. BREEZE: THAT WORKS FOR US, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. THOMAS: WHAT IS THE STATEMENT GOING TO BE EXACTLY? 
THE COURT: I THOUGHT I SAID IT. 
MR. THOMAS: LET ME JUST INTERJECT, THE ONLY CONCERN I 
HAD — THE ONLY CONCERN I HAD IS WHILE YOU WERE READING THE 
STATEMENT, THE THOUGHT CAME ACROSS MY MIND WAS, SO IS THERE 
SOMETHING OUT THERE. 
THE COURT: WELL, YOU SAID THAT AND I GUESS MR. BREEZE 
WOULD PREFER THAT I NOT REFER TO WHAT YOU SAID, ONLY JUST SAY 
THAT YOU'D MADE AN ERROR WITHOUT BEING SPECIFIC AS TO WHAT 
THE ERROR WAS, AND THEN INFORMING THE JURY THAT YOU RELY UPON 
CERTAIN EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE PARAPHERNALIA CHARGE. THAT'S 
WHAT YOU WANT, MR. BREEZE? 
MR. BREEZE: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. NOW, THE ONE JUROR STOOD UP AND 
VOLUNTEERED SOME INFORMATION ABOUT THE CALDWELLS. WHO ARE 
THE CALDWELLS? 
MR. THOMAS: IT'S THE CALDERS. 
THE COURT: CALDERS. 
MR. BREEZE 
MR. THOMAS 
MR. BREEZE 
COLLIER. 
COLLIERS, I'M SORRY. COLLIER. 
AND JUST TO MAKE IT REAL QUICK HERE, 
MR. COLLIER IS THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT. HE'S GONE THROUGH 
A NUMBER OF WIVES. APPARENTLY, THIS LADY'S SON IS NOW 
MARRIED TO ONE OF MR. COLLIER'S FORMER WIVES. 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
(Transcript of court's curative instruction (R. 435:162)) 
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(THE JURY ENTERS THE COURTROOM.) 
THE COURT: BE SEATED. AS YOU REALIZE, MS. BOREN HAS 
INDICATED THAT SHE HAD A RELATIONSHIP THAT SHE DIDN'T 
REALIZE, AND BECAUSE OF THAT, SHE'S BEEN EXCUSED. AND WE'LL 
CONTINUE WITH YOU EIGHT. 
OH, ALSO, MR. THOMAS HAS INFORMED ME THAT IN HIS OPENING 
STATEMENT, HE MADE AN ERROR. THE SECOND CHARGE IN THE 
INFORMATION OF THE CHARGE OF PARAPHERNALIA, THE STATE RELIES 
UPON TO PROVE THAT CHARGE THE PACKAGING THAT WAS LOCATED AT 
THE TIME OF THE TRANSFER. AS I UNDERSTAND IT, MR. THOMAS, IS 
THAT YOUR THEORY IN THIS CASE IS, IS THAT DRUGS WERE 
TRANSFERRED AND THEY WERE PACKAGED IN SOME ITEM, AND IT'S 
YOUR THEORY IN THIS CASE THAT THE PARAPHERNALIA WAS THE 
PACKAGING ITEM WITH THE DRUGS THAT WERE TRANSFERRED — THE 
ALLEGED DRUGS THAT WERE TRANSFERRED; IS THAT CORRECT? 
MR. THOMAS: THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: DOES THAT SATISFY YOU, COUNSEL ~ 
MR. BREEZE: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: — MR. BREEZE? 
OKAY. YOU MAY CALL YOUR FIRST WITNESS. 
MR. THOMAS: I WOULD CALL DETECTIVE KEITH CAMPBELL. 
KEITH CAMPBELL, 
BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED 
AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
Addendum C 
Addendum C 
(Defendant's proposed jury instruction no. 2) 
INSTRUCTION NO. / ' 
The testimony of a witness may be discredited or impeached by showing that the 
witness has been convicted of a felony, mat is, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for 
a term of years. A prior conviction does not mean that a witness is incompetent to testify, 
but is merely one circumstance that you may consider in determining the credibility of the 
witness. You may decide how much weight to give any prior conviction that was used to 
impeach a witness. 
10th Cir. Model Inst. 1.12 
IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION 
fr2/90'd t>5S383El08 0OWI0 WV 30:60 9002-52-Hdy 
Addendum D 
Addendum D 
(Jury instruction no. 7) 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER f 
You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses 
and of the weight to be given to the testimony of the different 
witnesses who have testified in this case, you may take into 
consideration bias, if any has been shown; their demeanor while 
testifying; how the information or knowledge was obtained; the 
apparent fairness or want of fairness; the interest the witness may 
have in the result of the trial; the reasonableness of the 
testimony; prior felony convictions; and any other factor which you 
believe is relevant to the witnesses credibility. 
Addendum E 
Addendum E 
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A. I DON'T THINK IT WAS THAT FAR, NO. 
Q. YOU — YOU DID ANOTHER REPORT ON THIS CASE, CORRECT? 
EARLIER — EARLIER ON? THAT YOU WERE REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO? 
IT DOESN'T HAVE A DATE HERE. 
MAYBE I'LL JUST APPROACH AND LET YOU TAKE A LOOK AT IT. 
NOW, YOU INDICATED IN THIS THAT COLLIER HAD NOT 
CONTACTED ANYONE WITH THE UINTAH BASIN STRIKE FORCE OTHER 
THAN TO MENTION HIS DESIRE TO WORK AS AN INFORMANT UNTIL THE 
ACTUAL DAY, WHICH WOULD BE 3/18, RIGHT? 
A. YES. 
Q. BUT THAT'S NOT TRUE, IS IT? 
A. I THINK IT IS, YES. 
Q. WELL, YOU'RE SOMEONE WITH THE UINTAH BASIN NARCOTIC 
STRIKE FORCE, RIGHT? 
A. YES. 
Q. RIGHT? AND HE CONTACTED YOU ON MULTIPLE OCCASIONS PRIOR 
TO 3/18, CORRECT? 
A. REGARDING DRUGS, NO. 
Q. WELL, I'M NOT ASKING YOU THAT. YOUR STATEMENT SAYS THAT 
THE ONLY TIME HE EVER CONTACTED ANYBODY WITH THE STRIKE FORCE 
OTHER THAN TO MENTION HIS DESIRE TO WORK AS AN INFORMANT WAS 
ON 
A. 
I 
Q. 
3/18. 
THAT 
THINK. 
AND -
ISN'T 
'S WHAI 
-- BUT 
THAT 
1
 I 
HE 
VE 
— 
WHAT YOU 
WRITTEN 
BUT IN ' 
WROTE 
, BUT 
rRUTH, 
HERE? 
THAT * S 
HE HAD 
AN INTERPRETATION, 
CONTACTED YOU 
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POSSIBLY AS MANY AS A DOZEN TIMES PREVIOUSLY. 
A. NOT AS A MEMBER YOU UINTAH BASIN NARCOTICS STRIKE FORCE, 
NO. 
Q. WELL, WAS THIS IN YOUR CAPACITY AS A ELDER OF YOUR 
CHURCH OR SOME OTHER CAPACITY? 
A. NO. 
Q. WELL, WHAT WAS — IF HE WASN'T CONTACTING YOU AS A 
STRIKE BASIN — STRIKE FORCE MEMBER, WHAT WAS HE CONTACTING 
YOU AS? 
A. I HAVE SEVERAL DIFFERENT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS. I'M AN 
INVESTIGATOR. I'M ALSO A MEMBER OF THE PROJECT SAFE 
NEIGHBORHOODS A.T.F. TASK FORCE. I'M ALSO A MEMBER OF THE 
UINTAH BASIN NARCOTICS STRIKE FORCE. HE DIDN'T CONTACT ME 
ABOUT DRUG ISSUES. THEREFORE, IT WASN'T TO DO WITH THE 
UINTAH BASIN NARCOTICS STRIKE FORCE. HE TALKED TO ME ABOUT 
PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS ISSUES, WHICH IS ONE OF MY FEDERAL 
PART-TIME JOBS. HE ALSO CONTACTED ME AS AN INVESTIGATOR WITH 
UINTAH COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT. 
Q. OKAY. BUT WHAT YOU WROTE DOWN HERE IS HE DIDN'T CONTACT 
ANYONE WITH THE UINTAH BASIN STRIKE FORCE. THAT'S WHAT YOU 
WROTE, WASN'T IT? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
AND THAT'S WHAT I JUST TOLD YOU. 
WELL, BUT HE — YOU'RE WITH THE STRIKE FORCE, RIGHT? 
YES. 
DID YOU — YOU DIDN'T ACTUALLY SEE HOW MR. COLLIER CAME 
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INTO POSSESSION OF THIS CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, DID YOU? 
A. NO. 
Q. AND — AND MR. COLLIER'S A PERSON OF — HE'S A VERY 
TRUTHFUL PERSON, RIGHT? 
MR. THOMAS: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR, I DON'T — 
THE COURT: SUSTAINED. 
MR. BREEZE: NOTHING FURTHER. 
THE COURT: MR. THOMAS, LET ME ASK THE JURY HOW THEY'RE 
DOING. PROBABLY ANOTHER HALF HOUR OR 45 MINUTES? 
MR. THOMAS: HARD TO ANTICIPATE, BUT I WOULD EXPECT AT 
LEAST A HALF HOUR. COULD BE 45 MINUTES. 
THE COURT: OKAY. WE'VE GONE A LITTLE BIT SLOWER THAN I 
WOULD HAVE ANTICIPATED AND SO I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT IF 
YOU'RE — IF YOU'RE FEELING UP TO IT THAT WE CONTINUE THROUGH 
THIS WITNESS IN ORDER TO HELP GIVE US MORE TIME TOMORROW TO 
BE ABLE TO FINISH THE MATTER TOMORROW. DOES ANYBODY HAVE ANY 
PROBLEMS WITH THAT? WOULD ANYBODY LIKE A RECESS BEFORE WE DO 
THIS? FIVE MINUTES? LET'S TAKE FIVE MINUTES SO YOU CAN JUST 
REFRESH YOURSELF. 
(THE COURT TOOK A BRIEF RECESS.) 
THE COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU. BE SEATED. LET'S SEE, 
YOUR CLIENT. THE RECORD WILL INDICATE THE JURY IS PRESENT. 
ATTORNEYS ARE PRESENT. WE NEED TO FIND YOUR CLIENT. 
MR. THOMAS: I'M SURE HE'S JUST OUT IN THE HALL. I KNOW 
DETECTIVE CAMPBELL WAS TRYING TO MAKE IT TO THE BATHROOM 
Addendum F 
Addendum F 
(Transcript of redirect examination of Detective Campbell and defendant's objection to 
reading report (R. 435:274-77)) 
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NARRATE. HE'S NOT ASKING QUESTIONS. 
THE COURT: SOUNDS FOUNDATIONAL TO ME. I'LL GIVE HIM 
SOME LATITUDE ON LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR WHERE HE'S GOING. 
Q. (BY MR. THOMAS) YOU PREPARED A DOCUMENT IN RELATION TO 
CONTACTS THAT HE HAD MADE AND PROVIDED IT TO THE DEFENSE 
COUNSEL AND PROSECUTION. 
A. YES, AT THE REQUEST OF THE COURT. 
Q. AND IT WAS REFERRED TO HERE SEVERAL TIMES, CORRECT? 
A. TWO DIFFERENT DOCUMENTS WERE, YES. 
Q. LET ME JUST FOCUS ON THE MOST — THE DOCUMENT THAT WAS 
REFERRED TO DURING THE LATTER PORTION OF YOUR 
CROSS-EXAMINATION, AND THERE WERE QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT'S CONTACT WITH THE STRIKE FORCE. 
A. OKAY. 
MR. THOMAS: MAY I APPROACH? WELL, ACTUALLY, LET ME 
HAVE THIS MARKED AS AN EXHIBIT. 
MR. BREEZE: YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO OBJECT TO THE 
INTRODUCTION — 
THE COURT: WELL, WAIT UNTIL IT'S OFFERED FOR 
INTRODUCTION BEFORE YOU MAKE YOUR OBJECTION. 
MR. THOMAS: MAY I APPROACH? 
THE COURT: MAY. 
Q. (BY MR. THOMAS) IS THIS THE SAME DOCUMENT THAT YOU 
REFERRED TO DURING CROSS-EXAMINATION? 
A. ONE OF THE DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY MR. BREEZE, YES. 
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Q. AND WERE THERE A SERIES OF QUESTIONS ASKED YOU 
CONCERNING CONTACT MADE FROM THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT TO 
THE STRIKE FORCE? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND WERE THERE REFERENCES MADE TO THIS SPECIFIC REPORT 
AND WHAT YOU SAID IN THIS REPORT? 
A. YES, THERE WERE. 
Q. CAN YOU REFER TO THOSE SAME THINGS AGAIN? 
A. OKAY. 
Q. AND CAN YOU READ WHAT YOU PUT IN THAT REPORT THAT WAS 
REFERRED TO? 
A. FIRST PARAGRAPH STATES — 
MR. BREEZE: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. THE ONLY THING I 
BROUGHT UP WAS THE SECOND PARAGRAPH. WE'RE GONNA HAVE TO DO 
SOME SERIOUS REDACTING. 
THE COURT: LET ME SEE THAT, CAN YOU? 
MR. THOMAS: YOUR HONOR, I BELIEVE HE'S ENTITLED TO 
REFER TO THE ENTIRE CONTEXT BECAUSE COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE 
NARROWED IT DOWN TO SPECIFIC — 
THE COURT: LET ME — WAIT A MINUTE. LET ME TAKE A LOOK 
AT IT FIRST. 
OBJECTION AS TO NUMBER 1 WILL BE OVERRULED. YOU MAY 
READ — I ASSUME THAT YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT — OBJECTION TO 
NUMBER 1 WILL BE OVERRULED. PARDON ME? 
WHAT I MEANT IS HE WAS REFERRING TO PARAGRAPH NUMBER 1 
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1 IN THE OBJECTION. HE MAY READ THAT. 
2 Q. (BY MR. THOMAS) GO AHEAD AND READ PARAGRAPH 1, AND THEN 
3 THE PARAGRAPH THAT WAS REFERRED TO BY THE DEFENSE. 
4 A. PARAGRAPH NUMBER 1 STATES, C.I. NUMBER 04303 BEGAN 
5 HIS/HER WORK WITH THE UINTAH BASIN NARCOTICS STRIKE FORCE AS 
6 A RESULT OF HIS/HER COURT CONVICTION. C.I. NUMBER 04303 
7 INFORMED DETECTIVE SERGEANT KEITH CAMPBELL THAT HE/SHE WANTED 
8 TO WORK FOR THE STRIKE FORCE IN ORDER TO MITIGATE HIS/HER 
9 SENTENCE. 
10 PARAGRAPH 2 STATES, C.I. NUMBER 04303 DID NOT CONTACT 
11 ANYONE WITH THE UINTAH BASIN NARCOTICS STRIKE FORCE OTHER 
12 THAN TO MENTION HIS/HER DESIRE TO WORK AS AN INFORMANT UNTIL 
13 THE ACTUAL DAY HE/SHE CONTACTED DETECTIVE SERGEANT CAMPBELL 
14 AND STATED THAT HE/SHE HAD ARRANGED TO PURCHASE 
15 METHAMPHETAMINE FROM BRAD MONTGOMERY. 
16 Q. SO IN THIS PARTICULAR DOCUMENT, WERE YOU REFERENCING ALL 
I 
17 CONTACTS YOU'VE HAD WITH THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT OR JUST 
18 THOSE IN RELATION TO THIS TRANSACTION? 
19 A. JUST THE ONES THAT WOULD RELATE TO THE UINTAH BASIN 
20 NARCOTICS STRIKE FORCE. AS I STATED EARLIER, I WEAR A LOT OF 
21 HATS AND ACT IN A LOT OF DIFFERENT CAPACITIES. 
22 Q. AND SO ALL THESE OTHER TRANS — OR CONTACTS YOU HAD WITH 
23 HIM MAY HAVE EXISTED, BUT THEY WEREN'T SPECIFICALLY RELATED 
24 TO THIS; IS THAT CORRECT? 
25 A. YES, THEY DIDN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH SETTING UP A 
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DRUG TRANSACTION OR ANY SPECIFIC DRUG INFORMATION. THEY WERE 
JUST OTHER CONTACTS. THEY MAY HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH HIS GUN 
CASE. THEY MAY HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH JUST LIFE. THEY MAY 
HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH JUST STATUS OF HIS GUN CASE, WHERE WE 
WERE GOING. THEY WERE DIFFERENT TOPICS EACH TIME, BUT THIS 
IS THE ONLY CONTACT THAT HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH A DRUG 
TRANSACTION. 
Q. AND THIS WAS IN RESPONSE TO A SPECIFIC QUESTION AS IN 
RELATION TO THIS CASE. 
A. CORRECT. 
Q. AND SO IT WAS FOCUSED ON THAT; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. YES, IT WAS. 
Q. NOW, YOU SAID — YOU ALSO SAID IN CROSS-EXAMINATION, 
REFERENCING ANOTHER DOCUMENT THAT YOU PREPARED, REQUESTED THE 
COURT, ABOUT SOMETHING ABOUT MALFUNCTIONS ON MACHINERY, 
RECORDING MACHINERY. 
A. YES. 
Q. WHAT DID YOU MEAN WHEN YOU USED THE TERM MALFUNCTION IN 
THAT PARTICULAR DOCUMENT? DO YOU NEED TO REFER TO THE 
DOCUMENT? 
A. I'D LIKE TO, YES. 
THE COURT: I THINK YOU MIGHT HAVE MR. REESE'S COPY 
THERE STILL. OR DID YOU PICK THAT UP? 
MR. BREEZE: I TOOK IT BACK, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: DID YOU? 
Addendum G 
Addendum G 
(Detective Campbell's report on confidential informant) 
Uintah Basin Narcotics Strike Force 
Response to 8* District Court ruling; 
Confidential Informant #04-303 
C.I. #04-303 began his/her work with the Uintah Basin Narcotics Strike 
Force as a result of his/her court conviction. C.L #04-303 informed Detective 
Sergeant Keith Campbell that he/she wanted to work for the "Strike Force" 
in order to mitigate his/her sentence. 
CI. #04-303 did not contact anyone with the Uintah Basin Narcotics Strike 
Force other than to mention his/her desire to work as an informant until the 
actual day he/she contacted Detective Sergeant Campbell and stated that 
he/she had arranged to purchase methamphetamine from Brad Montgomery. 
C.L #04-303 participated in one controlled purchase of methamphetamine. A 
period of time passed after the transaction;, and C.L #04-303 was taken into 
custody by the U.S. Marshals. 
CI. #04-303 was sentenced in Federal court, and it is unknown if he/she 
received any sentencing consideration regarding his/her agreement with the 
Uintah Basin Narcotics Strike Force. 
It should be noted that due to the circumstances surrounding this informant's 
relationship with the Uintah Basin Narcotics Strike Force, and his/her federal 
custody status, he/she did not complete an informant packet. On the day of 
the transaction with Brad Montgomery, C.L #04-303 was instructed 
regarding the procedures necessary to complete a controlled purchase. No 
other contact was made with C.L #04-303. 
^ 4 id 
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